Central Bank Credibility Under Inferential Expectations
نویسندگان
چکیده
The theory of inferential expectations states that “economic agents hold beliefs that are subject to falsification by new information, in much the same way that they are in conventional statistical hypothesis testing.” We outline the role expectations play in current monetary economic theory by ∗Corresponding author. Contact details: Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia; Tel: +61-2-61255540; Fax: +61-2-61255570; Email: [email protected].
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تاریخ انتشار 2008