Modality in Language

This article discusses some of the ways in which natural language can express modal information—information which is, to a first approximation, about what could be or must be the case, as opposed to being about what actually is the case. It motivates, explains, and raises problems for Angelika Kratzer’s influential theory of modal auxiliaries, and introduces a new approach to one important debate about the relationships between modality, evidentiality, context change, and imperative force. Natural language providesmanyways to expressmodal information—information which is, to a first approximation, about what could be or must be the case, as opposed to being about what actually is the case. In some cases it’s controversial whether a sentence expresses modal information. But as a starting point, consider the following examples of modality in language: (1) It’s not possible that this table be made of ice. (2) If this table is made of wood, then it couldn’t have been made of ice. (3) If this table had been made of ice, then it wouldn’t have been possible for it to be made of wood. (4) The table she ordered should be made of ice. (5) The table she ordered is to be made of ice. (6) Most of the tables here might be made of ice. For helpful discussion and comments, thanks to Kai von Fintel, Sarah Moss, Brian Weatherson, and an anonymous referee.