Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Sophisticated Ewa Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games

Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games

1 This research was supported by NSF Grants SBR 9730364 and SBR 9730187. Many thanks to Vince Crawford, Drew Fudenberg, David Hsia, John Kagel, and Xin Wang for discussions and help. Helpful comments were also received from seminar participants at Berkeley, Caltech, Harvard, Hong Kong UST, and Wharton. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Cal...

Nber Working Paper Series Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study

Measurement error is ubiquitous in experimental work. It leads to imperfect statistical controls, attenuated estimated effects of elicited behaviors, and biased correlations between characteristics. We develop simple statistical techniques for dealing with experimental measurement error. These techniques are applied to data from the Caltech Cohort Study, which conducts repeated incentivized sur...

Behavioral contagion during learning about another agent’s risk-preferences acts on the neural representation of decision-risk

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125; Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Melbourne, Carlton, VIC 3010, Australia; Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3052, Australia; and Computation and Neural Systems, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 9...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 on Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Learning Dynamics in Mechanism Design: an Experimental Comparison of Public Goods Mechanisms

In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, dynamic behavior may affect the efficiency of various mechanisms thought to be efficient in one-shot games. Inspired by results obtained in previous experiments, the current paper proposes a simple best response model in which players’ beliefs are functions of previous strategy profiles. The predictions of the model are found to be highly consiste...