Dale Jacquette CONUNDRUMS OF CONDITIONALS IN CONTRAPOSITION

نویسنده

  • Dale Jacquette
چکیده

A previously unnoticed metalogical paradox about contraposition is formulated in the informal metalanguage of propositional logic, where it exploits a reflexive self-non-application of the truth table definition of the material conditional to achieve semantic diagonalization. Three versions of the paradox are considered. The main modal formulation takes as its assumption a conditional that articulates the truth table conditions of conditional propositions in stating that if the antecedent of a true conditional is false, then it is possible for its consequent to be true. When this true conditional is contraposed in the conclusion of the inference, it produces the false conditional conclusion that if it is not the case that the consequent of a true conditional can be true, then it is not the case that the antecedent of the conditional is false.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Liar Paradox and Substitution into Intensional Contexts

John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I propose in ‘Denying the Liar’ and ‘Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.’ Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and its expression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to sh...

متن کامل

A Compositional Semantics for 'If Then' Conditionals

This paper presents the first compositional semantics for if then conditionals. The semantics of each element are first examined separately. The meaning of if is modeled according to a possible worlds semantics. The particle then is analyzed as an anaphoric word that places its focused element inside the context settled by a previous element. Their meanings are subsequently combined in order to...

متن کامل

Disquotation, Conditionals, and the Liar

In this paper I respond to Jacquette’s criticisms, in (Jacquette, 2008), of my (Barker, 2008). In so doing, I argue that the Liar paradox is in fact a problem about the disquotational schema, and that nothing in Jacquette’s paper undermines this diagnosis.

متن کامل

Naturalism and Ontology: a Reply to Dale Jacquette†

For many years now, philosophical naturalism has enjoyed the status of orthodoxy in the Western academy; and it is widely recognized among theists as one of the most important sources of opposition to belief in God. In World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, I raised two main objections against naturalism. First, I argued that there is an important sense in which natur...

متن کامل

Undeniably Paradoxical: Reply to Jacquette

Can we solve the Liar paradox by simply declaring Liar sentences to be false? That is the proposal of Dale Jacquette in (Jacquette, 2007). The Liar paradox arises because apparently we can derive a contradiction from the assumption that the Liar sentence is true, and we can also derive a contradiction from the assumption that it is false. Jacquette argues that the former reasoning (i.e., the de...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2000