Malink : Review of P . Crivelli : Aristotle on Truth ; in : Philosophie Antique

P. Crivelli (PC) presents the first monograph to systematically reconstruct Aristotle's views on truth scattered over several writings. He approaches Aristotle from the perspective of analytic philosophy. This approach involves asking Aristotlèquestions he never dreamt of, perhaps even questions he lacked the conceptual apparatus to understand or to answer' (p. 40). However, the result is an accomplished piece of scholarly work which displays a high degree of historical sensitivity while establishing a fruitful dialogue between Aristotle and modern analytic problems. PC proceeds by a thorough examination of the relevant passages, carefully weighing up competing interpretations. Having resolved to be explicit where Aristotle is not, PC keeps the reader well briefed about which decisions his reconstruction rests on. A lucid and relaxed way of presentation makes this book an enjoyable read. The author starts by giving a detailed overview of his results (pp. 1-39). This is most useful and provides a clear understanding of the main ideas developed in the book. The book itself has three parts. The first one is about`Bearers of truth or falsehood'. These are truth-evaluable thoughts, sentences and, remarkably, certain objects (pragmata) which are neither linguistic nor mental. Among these objects are states of affairs, which are composed of two further objects, one of which being a universal while the other is either a universal or an individual. A state of affairs is true at those times at which the objects of which it is composed are combined in a certain way. It is false at those times at which the objects are divided in a certain way. There is, for example, a state of affairs of your being seated or of the diagonal's being commensurable. There are nònegative' states of affairs such as your not being seated. There are some more objects capable of being true and false. For instance, material substances are true when they exist, i.e. when their form is combined with their matter. They are false when they do not exist, i.e. when their form is divided from their matter. Simple non-composed objects, i.e. essences or incorporeal substances such as God, are true and false in virtue of their simply existing or non-existing respectively. It is the truth and falseness of objects that makes truth-evaluable thoughts and sentences true or false. Predicative thoughts or sentences are those concerning states of affairs; existential thoughts or sentences are those concerning material substances or simple objects. …