Tractarian objects and logical categories

It has been much debated whether the Tractarian objects are what Russell would have called particulars or whether they include also properties and relations. This paper claims that the debate is misguided: there is no logical category such that Wittgenstein intended the reader of the Tractatus to understand his objects either as providing examples of or as not providing examples of that category. This is not to say that Wittgenstein set himself against the very idea of a logical category: quite the contrary. However, where Russell presents his logical variety of particulars and the various types of universal, and Frege presents his of objects and the various types of function, Wittgenstein denies the propriety of such a priori expositions. Wittgenstein envisages a variety of logical types of entity but insists that the nature of these types is something to be discovered only through analysis. This paper begins with a review of a familiar debate whether Tractarian objects are particulars or include also universals. In the second section I abstract from that debate: a proposal is made rather for framing the question of how Tractarian objects are to be placed with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Section three notes some equivalences for that question, so framed, and takes a first look at Wittgenstein’s response. Wittgenstein’s position is then explored more fully in section four. The penultimate section five draws together the conclusions of sections two through four and compares them with the debate discussed in section one and also with the positions of certain exegetes not party to that debate. Section six deals with some loose ends and makes a quick connection to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.