On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case
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چکیده
We investigate sufficient conditions for the existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibria that satisfy the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT ). In the Bayesian game Gn among n jurors, we allow for arbitrary distribution on the types of jurors. In particular, any kind of dependency is possible. If each juror i has a “constant strategy”, σ i (that is, a strategy that is independent of the size n≥ i of the jury), such that σ = (σ 1,σ 2, . . . ,σn . . .) satisfies the CJT , then by McLennan (1998) there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that also satisfies the CJT . We translate the CJT condition on sequences of constant strategies into the following problem:
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تاریخ انتشار 2010