Dynamic Model of Double Electronic Vickrey Auction

نویسندگان

  • Vitaliy Kobets
  • Valeria Yatsenko
  • Maksim Poltoratskiy
چکیده

The paper deals with different approaches to the definition of ecommerce, including special mechanisms for the distribution of goods and payments, such as auction model. Different formats of auctions that change welfare of their participants are investigated. Software modules were developed for researching the effectivenes of double electronic Vickrey auction. It is defined that in double Vickrey auction incentives for most buyers and sellers are created to reveal their true types. The developed software module of double Vickrey auction showed the highest efficiency in the terms of social welfare among alternative formats and disproved the ability of Vickrey auction to achieve results like market mechanism of perfect competition.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015