Which Certificate Authority Should LIGO Use?
ثبت نشده
چکیده
LIGO wishes to remove the burden from users of requesting, retrieving, and managing X.509 digital certificates and the associated private keys. A new authentication and authorization infrastructure design includes deploying MyProxy servers at all LIGO computing sites, and storing X.509 certificates and private keys in the MyProxy repositories. Rather than generating a proxy certificate using a locally stored and managed certificate and private key, users will retrieve a proxy credential from the MyProxy server after first authenticating to the MyProxy server using other LIGO credentials (primarily a Kerberos credential). The private keys will be stored unencrypted so that the MyProxy server can generate and issue a proxy certificate to the authenticated user. The certificates and keys stored in the MyProxy repositories are managed by the infrastructure and administrators so that end users no longer need to request, retrieve, and manage the certificate and key files. Storing unencrypted in a central repository the associated private keys for X.509 certificates issued by the DOEGrids CA would violate the DOEGrids Certificate Policy (see section 2.1.2 of version 2.9 of the policy document), and currently LIGO users are issued X.509 credentials signed by the DOEGrids CA. Three options are identified for moving forward with the new infrastructure: 1) start a dialogue with the DOEGrids CA to determine if the existing policy can be amended to support the desired LIGO use case or perhaps another subordinate CA might be created and managed by the DOEGrids CA to support the LIGO use case. 2) Continue a dialogue with the TeraGrid about the TeraGrid CA issuing credentials to LIGO users to be stored in LIGO MyProxy repositories. 3) Deploy a LIGO CA.
منابع مشابه
Implementation and Evaluation of Certificate Revocation List Distribution for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) were designed to provide safety and comfort for passengers. Security measurements have to be taken for guaranteeing these. The security consists in making use of asymmetric cryptography for signing messages sent out by the vehicle. But cryptographic material can be compromised or a misbehavior can occur due to some errors. For these reasons the VANET entities ...
متن کاملAuthorization and Certificates: Are We Pushing When We Should Be Pulling?
Certificates have long been used to bind authorization information to an identity or public key. Essentially there are two ways in which a verifying authority (reference monitor) can obtain the information (from a certificate) that is required to make an access control decision: the requesting entity provides the privilege attributes to the verifying authority – a ‘push’ model; or the verifying...
متن کاملMiniCA: A Web-Based Certificate Authority
The MiniCA project is proposed and developed to address growing demand for inexpensive access to security features such as privacy, strong authentication, and digital signatures. These features are integral to publickey encryption technologies. Digital certificates are vital in improving access to and use of new security technologies. Granting and revocation of digital certificates is overseen ...
متن کاملA Framework for Adaptive Information Security Systems : A Holistic Investigation
This paper describes a security system for authorization in open networks. Authorization means authority to access certain resources, to perform certain operations, or to use certain system functions. In this paper, the authorization system bases on use of attribute certificates. An attribute certificate is a signed object containing authorization attributes of a user. Before checking whether a...
متن کاملRestricting Access with Certificate Attributes in Multiple Root Environments-A Recipe for Certificate Masquerading
The issue of certificate masquerading against the SSL protocol is pointed out in [4]. In [4], various forms of server certificate masquerading are identified. It should also be noted that the attack described is a man-in-themiddle (MITM) attack that requires direct manipulation of the SSL protocol. This paper is a mirror of [4] and involves client certificate masquerading. The motivation for th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008