Working with Your Neighbors: Incentives in Networked Coordination Games∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
Coordination in groups often converges to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium. In this paper we test the effect of changes to the payoff structure, focusing on the effect of increasing versus decreasing the onversus off-equilibrium payoffs, on equilibrium selection in coordination games. Our four treatments change the baseline coordination game payoff structure along two dimensions: 1) changing onversus off-equilibrium payoffs and 2) increasing or decreasing payoffs relative to a baseline. We find that while the treatments do not increase coordination success on the Pareto efficient equilibrium significantly, changing payoffs, especially the onequilibrium payoffs, deters inefficient coordination. However the on-equilibrium incentives also lead to more miscoordination and a lower level of play efficiency. We also find that individual strategy choices depend on the incentive structure. Although a significant fraction of subjects always choose the risk dominant strategy, the on-equilibrium incentives encourage more tit for tat strategies. We do not find that decreasing payoffs leads to different behaviors than increasing payoffs.
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تاریخ انتشار 2016