Competitive equilibrium with equal incomes for allocation of indivisible objects
نویسنده
چکیده
In AAMAS 2014, Bouveret and Lemâıtre (2014) presented a hierarchy of fairness concepts for allocation of indivisible objects. Among them CEEI (Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) was the strongest. In this note, we settle the complexity of computing a discrete CEEI assignment by showing it is strongly NP-hard. We then highlight a fairness notion (CEEI-FRAC) that is even stronger than CEEI for discrete assignments, is always Pareto optimal, and can be verified in polynomial time. We also show that computing a CEEIFRAC discrete assignment is strongly NP-hard in general but polynomial-time computable if the utilities are zero or one.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Oper. Res. Lett.
دوره 43 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015