Crop Insurance and Crop Production : An Empirical Study of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

نویسندگان

  • John Quiggin
  • Giannis Karagiannis
چکیده

anonymous referee for helpful comments and criticism.

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تاریخ انتشار 1997