Fictitious play in stochastic games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we examine an extension of the fictitious play process for bimatrix games to stochastic games. We show that the fictitious play process does not necessarily converge, not even in the 2 × 2 × 2 case with a unique equilibrium in stationary strategies. Here 2 × 2 × 2 stands for 2 players, 2 states, 2 actions for each player in each state.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Meth. of OR
دوره 66 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007