PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ A Place for Protoconsciousness?
نویسنده
چکیده
I argue that Gregg Rosenberg’s panexperientialism is either extremely implausible or irrelevant to the mystery of consciousness by introducing metaphysical and conceptual objections to his appeal to the notion of ‘protoconsciousness’.
منابع مشابه
PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ ROBINSON: COLORS, AROUSAL, FUNCTIONALISM
Some philosophers have regarded the connection between hues and certain arousal or affective qualities as so intimate as to make them inseparable, and this “necessary concomitance view” has been invoked to defend functionalism against arguments based on inverted spectra. Support for the necessary concomitance view has sometimes been thought to accrue from experiments in psychology. This paper e...
متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ OPIE: BEYOND THE FRINGE Beyond the Fringe
Mangan makes a useful contribution to our understanding of the structure and function of the nonsensory fringe of consciousness. I offer a few friendly amendments and criticisms. In particular, I argue that the fringe/focus structure of experience is considerably more complex than Mangan allows, and that his account of the function of fringe experience doesn’t do justice to the emergent nature ...
متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Review of David Buller’s Adapting Minds
Popularisations of evolutionary psychology have had a truly remarkable success. Judging by the popular press one could be forgiven for think that contemporary psychology is essentially co-extensive with evolutionary psychology. In the academy evolutionary psychological has been subject to some extremely hard-hitting and destructive attacks, but to date no approachable, popular critique has been...
متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Introduction: Consciousness and Self-Representation
The symposium before us examines aspects of the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and self-representation—in particular, the alleged capacity of some mental state to represent themselves. The hypothesis under consideration is that all and only conscious states are self-representational in this way. The symposium contains two papers favoring the hypothesis (Ismael and Brook and Raymo...
متن کاملPSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Unconscious subjectivity
Subjectivity is essential to consciousness. But though subjectivity is necessary for consciousness it is not sufficient. In part one I derive a distinction between conscious awareness and unconscious subjectivity from a critique of Block’s (1995) distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness. In part two I contrast two historically influential models of unconscious thought: cognitive ...
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تاریخ انتشار 2006