On formal and automatic security verification of WSN transport protocols

In this paper, we address the problem of formal and automated security verification ofWSN transport protocols that may perform cryptographic operations. The verification ofthis class of protocols is difficult because they typically consist of complex behavioral charac-teristics, such as real-time, probabilistic, and cryptographic operations. To solve this problem,we propose a probabilistic timed calculus for cryptographic protocols, and demonstrate howto use this formal language for proving security or vulnerability of protocols. The main ad-vantage of the proposed language is that it supports an expressive syntax and semantics,including bisimilarities that supports real-time, probabilistic, and cryptographic issues at thesame time. Hence, it can be used to verify the systems that involve these three properties in amore convenient way. In addition, we propose an automatic verification method, based on thewell-known PAT process analysis toolkit, for this class of protocols. For demonstration pur-poses, we apply the proposed manual and automatic proof methods for verifying the securityof DTSN and SDTP, which are two of the recently proposed WSN tranport protocols.