Resource Allocation and Access to Criminal Courts: an Economic Model

Cost to society, scarcity of resources and effectiveness are recurrent if not omnipresent themes in scholarly analyses of the criminal justice system. In this article Professor Noam offers an economic analysis ofjudicial dispositions in criminal cases. After employing a mathematical model. calculus and statistical illustrations, Professor Noam concludes that the phenomenon of plea-bargaining in a crowded court-system yields not only a cheaper method oj disposition but the more effective one in terms ofreduced crime. Professor Noam's analysis is confined to a maximization of this economic benefit, while admitting that important social factors not similarly amenable to economic investigation are also involved. The same analytical tools are applied to the corollary issues Of optimal court size (number of judges), the economic benefits associated with reduced crime and the allocation of available court time. Here the approach is to look for the optimal "mix" ofcases which go to trial. The optimal mix will be determined in the light ojcategories ofoffence and the marginal benefits oj the trial itself as a means for reducing criminal activity within each category.