Theories in the Field of Community Psychology

In this article, we review some of the key attributes of useful theories and assess whether these attributes are present in several prominent Community Psychology theories. The field of Community Psychology often deals with complex systems and attempts to create change through the use of multiple mechanisms. It has provided researchers new ways of thinking about contextual factors and how participants could be more involved in research efforts. However, this field has encountered significant challenges in testing and evaluating theories that involve system-level environmental change. It has struggled to establish consensus when operationally defining criteria and when creating reliable instruments for measuring theoretical constructs. We conclude that Community Psychology theories have tended to function as frameworks, which indicate important elements to examine, but do not specify relationships that can be used for explanation and are, therefore, too broad to make the types of predictions characteristic of science. Because Community Psychology theories have often served as orienting frameworks, there needs to be more discussion about their usefulness, and whether community psychologists can develop more rigorous and specific theories. This has implications for formulating various practices and for discussions about how future research can better inform theory. Theoretical issues abound in many areas of psychology. Meehl (1978, pp. 806), one of the more vocal advocates of the importance of theory, has stated: “most so called theories in the soft areas of psychology (clinical, counseling, social, personality, community, and school psychology) are scientifically unimpressive and technologically worthless.” While this stance reflects a positivistic approach to psychology that is not necessarily embraced by all community psychologists, the charge is worth consideration nonetheless (Kloos, Hill, Thomas, Wandersman, Elias, & Dalton, 2012). It would be useful for the field to have a clear, shared understanding around the use of the term “theory” and when and how it applies to the work that we do. It is in this spirit that we explore some of the key “theories” used by community psychologists in order to assess whether or not they fit within the concept of theory as traditionally defined in scientific inquiry. In order to do this we must first trace the definition and use of the idea of “theory” in these terms and then we must determine which of them within the field of community psychology might be fruitfully analyzed using this rubric. Defining and Using Theory in Scientific Inquiry According to Kerlinger (1986), “A theory is a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena” (p. 11). A hallmark of the scientific process is the development and testing of theories, and, consequently, those disciplines without good theoretical foundations are often seen as less rigorous or less valuable to the larger scientific community. Theories allow data to be organized, systematized, and interpreted. Some would argue that without theories it is harder to achieve progress towards useful accumulated knowledge. McAdams and Pals (2007) state that: "Theory is at the heart of science” (p 3), and Feynman (1997) believes that if academics are not engaging in theoretical work, their contributions are best Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2016 Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp.org/ Page 4 categorized as an engineering endeavor rather than true science. Of course, others would disagree with Feynman’s (1997) assessment. In the field of medicine, for example, much occurs that is practical and contributes to the larger mission of both patient care and the development of new therapeutic methods. In fact, many medical discoveries such as the discovery of penicillin, which began the modern era of antibiotic development (Colebrook, 1956), are the result of serendipity rather than programmatic theory-tested experiments. However, even within the more applied disciplines such as medicine, there are implicit theoretical models. For example, theoretical models regarding cell function, cell growth, and biochemical change have allowed scientists to develop interventions for a number of neurodegenerative diseases (Sheikh, Safia, Haque, & Mir, 2013). Though there are distinctions between those who practice medicine and those whose research explicitly wields theory, many believe theories apply to both types of activities and, more importantly, are the driving force for innovations. It is even possible to argue that in any research or clinical practice, there is always a theoretical model in operation. Criteria for Evaluating Theories Theories serve three purposes—describing, explaining, and predicting phenomena (Jiang, 1998). First, theories are used to describe a phenomenon. These descriptive processes are then used to explain why the phenomenon occurs, and this explanatory framework is then used in making inferential predictions. A well-formulated theory should also be able to explain the phenomena of interest and posit under which circumstances and conditions (people, settings, and times) a given set of propositions should apply. This provides a better understanding of the phenomenon of interest and allows for a more critical analysis. For example, Affective Events Theory (AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) posits that affective behaviors (e.g., citizenship behaviors such as courtesy, conscientiousness, and sportsmanship) are directly related to affective experiences, while judgment-driven behaviors (e.g., leaving a setting) are indirectly related to affect through the attitudes (e.g. satisfaction and commitment) formed by such experiences. This distinction is a critical part of understanding the relationship between affective events and behavior, and this theory has been fruitfully applied to community settings (Beasley & Jason, 2015). According to Reichenbach (1938), there is a distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. In the context of discovery, people describe what they have stumbled upon; whereas in the context of justification, they make predictions and then test these ideas in order to prove or disprove them. Indeed, the prevalent practice of generating hypotheses and theories after the data have been analyzed (known as HARKing; Hypothesizing After the Results are Known; Kerr, 1998) has received quite a bit of critical attention. In these circumstances it is possible that one is only explaining phenomena through the lens of what is already known. Feynman (1997) has described good science as a process of “bending over backward to show oneself wrong.” With HARKed theoretical explanation, there is an absence of such “bending over backwards.” As an approach to inquiry, it leans towards affirmation, risking a result that simply confirms what a researcher already believes to be true. This is reminiscent of Meehl’s (1967) argument that psychologists’ reliance on post-hoc explanation of why phenomena did or did not occur obscures the field’s ability to assess why people function as they do. To counteract the bias of HARK, some researchers suggest that theories need to be: 1) articulated (and perhaps hypotheses even registered before research is conducted) this is akin to Nozek and Bar-Anan’s (2012) concept of Open Science and 2) tested a priori Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2016 Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp.org/ Page 5 so that one can see whether or not any given theory acts as a valid “inference ticket” for human phenomena. It should be noted that some have raised important concerns regarding the classic context of discovery/context of justification distinction (e.g., Hoyningien-Huene, 2006), but even while questioning the merit of such an unambiguous binary divide, most would still recognize the need for “a distinct normative perspective that aims at the evaluation of scientific claims” HoyningienHuene, 2006, p. 130). A major aim of this article is to attempt to apply some “normative perspective” regarding the use of theory to work in the field of Community Psychology and to generate what we hope will be a productive conversation around such aims. One such normative criteria often used in science is that good theories need to offer clear predictions regarding what should happen with new data, and these predictions should be capable of being rigorously tested and falsified (Popper, 1968). According to Borsboom (2013), “A good scientific theory allows you to infer what would happen to things in certain situations without creating the situations...Theories should be interpreted as inference tickets.” Otherwise, a theory is too broad to make the types of predictions characteristic of science. In making predictions about new data, theories provide insight into how human behavior works in systematic ways. Ultimately, theories are part of the process where observations become evidence for generalizable knowledge, which can have useful applicability. Theories also deal with falsifiability and utility (Bacharach, 1989; Huber, 2008; Van de Ven, 1989). Finally, when using theories in research, investigators need to assess the applicability of a theory within a variety of contexts in order to describe the boundary conditions in which the theory predictions hold or do not hold. For example, under classical conditions, the theory of gravitation is correct. But, gravitational theory does not apply at quantum distances or extremely high energies—that is, there is no theory of quantum gravity. Gravity applies very nicely when predicting motion of objects, but not under all conditions (i.e., air resistance of a dropped object must be considered). While the boundaries of the theory of gravitation seem quite obvious in this example, analogous boundaries are not always as clear in the theories often used in the field of Community Psychology. Consider learning theory. Skinner (1971) asserted that reinforcement is a key component of learning in both humans and pigeons. However, when attentional capacity is limited (e.g., by serious head injury, overwhelming environmental stimuli, intense emotional states), learning may not occur in the same manner. It is difficult to train pigeons to fight adversaries, as they may be evolutionarily hardwired for flight rather than fight. Boundary conditions are one of the ways theories can be a basis for progress, and part of such advancement involves developing better understandings of when and how a theory does and does not apply to particular settings and circumstances. If Bowlby (1969; 1980) had not proposed a clear theory that allowed for predictions and experimentation, Ainsworth would not have made her discovery about boundary conditions. Bowlby’s (1969; 1980) influential Attachment Theory within developmental psychology postulated that a relationship with a stable consistent caregiver is important for emotional development. Ainsworth and Bell (1970) tested this theory by observing parent-child interactions, and noticed that not all children reacted to separation from and reunion with their parents in the same manner. The relationship between children and their parents plays a significant role in children’s feelings of security. In other words, the theory did not apply universally and boundary conditions related to individual differences existed. Although the primary purpose of theory is to explain current Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2016 Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp.org/ Page 6 phenomena and predict how things may behave in the future, some have used theory to explain and understand past events. There are other sets of criteria for theory assessment, that are beyond the scope of this paper such as importance, precision and clarity, parsimony and simplicity, comprehensiveness, operationality, empirical validation or verification, fruitfulness, and practicality (Patterson, 1986). Clearly defining theory in this manner is important because often “theory,” “model” and “framework” are used interchangeably; however, there are important differences in these concepts (See Figure 1). A framework informs researchers of the types of elements that are considered important avenues of investigation. It largely performs the descriptive function of a theory with limited explanatory and/or predictive qualities. A well-known example is Bronfennbrenner’s (1979) framework, which is made up of macrosystem, mesosystem and microsystem elements. However, because the terms macrosystem, mesosystem, and microsystem are not specific, the framework does not make predictions. In other words, without further refinement, this framework does not specify relationships that can be used for explanation and prediction. Therefore, a framework could be described as a set of orienting principles which, however, require more specific definition, operationalization, and so on, in order to be applied in any given research or other circumstance. For example, Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) framework can be used to specify and operationalize the proposition that proximal systems are likely to have greater impact on individuals than distal systems and investigations targeting these different levels of impact could be used to evaluate this very point. However, as it stands the framework itself simply points to multiple levels of influence. If researchers look backwards, Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems framework does seem to describe how some social systems work, but it is not specific enough to be testable in a rigorous sense. Within one framework, often multiple theories can be derived, and often each theory might have several different models and accompanying hypotheses (See Figure 1). Figure 1. Relationship among one framework, which might have several theories and models NOTE: There may be one or more hypothesis within each model. In this figure for the sake of simplicity we only list two hypotheses per model. In the interests of clarity and consensus about the use of these terms within the field of Community Psychology, we intend to explore some of the classic “theories” which have been much beloved in the field. We consider the question of whether these theories might Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2016 Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp.org/ Page 7 be more productively classified and used as frameworks because they lack the ability to aid with the operationalization and prediction inherent to a definition of theory as classically used in scientific inquiry. Frameworks are certainly important and useful, but thinking through how we as a field can more explicitly flesh out these frameworks into sets of testable theories would go a long way toward making significant progress in understanding complex systems and the contexts in which people live their lives. Community Psychology Before applying this rubric to the major theories put forth in the field, it is important to situate the philosophy of science outlined above (and its core definition of theory) within the context of Community Psychology and practice. Community Psychology emerged about 50 years ago. As the field evolved, certain recurring themes also emerged: emphasizing prevention over treatment, highlighting competencies over weaknesses, collaborating across disciplines, exploring ecological understandings of people within their environment, promoting diversity, and focusing on community building as a mode of intervention (Moritsugu, Vera, Wong, & Duffy, 2013). These concepts focused on new ways of thinking about contextual factors and how participants could be more involved in research efforts. These concepts also concentrated more on public health systems and preventive approaches (Kloos, et. al., 2012). At an influential community methods conference, Tolan, Keys, Chertok, and Jason (1990) responded to a multitude of issues facing the field of Community Psychology, and introduced a dialogue regarding criteria necessary to define research of merit as well as methodological considerations in implementing ecologically-driven research. Participants at this conference appealed for the careful construction and testing of theory in community research (p. 226). A later Community Psychology methods conference explored the gap in the scientific knowledge and practice of community based research methodologies emphasizing participatory research (Jason et al., 2004). Theories of context and action for social change (Lewin, 1946; Vygotsky, 1981) have been part of the Community Psychology field from its inception and continue to be utilized [e.g., Seidman’s (1988) theory of social regularities in social settings]. Community Psychology was founded as a discipline that is intended to combine a scientific orientation with collaborative social action in order to empower members of some community of interest and to help them improve their lives. This orientation results in some important differences between the “hard” sciences and Community Psychology, in that it takes account of the fact that humans are cognitive, agentic units, and cannot be acted upon as though they were inert objects. This implies that some level of collaboration will always be required to institute social change. Additionally, this orientation has also sensitized the field to a need to listen to social actors, rather than to prescribe to them, which in turn has led to many insights regarding what life is like from the point of view of community members. However, these goals might run the risk of subordinating some potentially very important aspects of scientific development, including the development of theories capable of effectively describing, predicting, and explaining important phenomena. It is possible to think about different fields of psychology as having different goals. For example, developmental psychology aims to document and understand the changes in humans across the lifespan. The goal of Community Psychology has been expressed as an attempt to understand the ways that altering specific human contexts (and perhaps the relationship between people and their contexts) alleviates human suffering. Although much of the explanation of individual difference “to date” has focused on genetics/nature and accumulated Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2016 Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp.org/ Page 8 experience/nurture, there may also be a significant amount of variance that can be accounted for by our interactions with our current environment. Community Psychology has much to contribute to this area, both in terms of theories to describe the impacts of context and environment, as well as reliable and valid measures to capture these complex phenomena.