Structuration Theory and New Technology: A Coherent Theoretical Framework for Greater Understanding of Computer-Aided Design (CAD) in the Organisation

It is becoming generally established that modern research and writings need to acknowledge the organisational context which surrounds the use of a technology (for example see Buchanan and Boddy 1987). However previous efforts have been criticized for their failure to accumulate consistent research findings or develop coherent theoretical frameworks (Markus and Robey 1988). Part of the problem is that a wide diversity of perspectives is adopted by organisational researchers and fundamental issues behind these perspectives have yet to be properly examined and resolved (see Burrell and Morgan 1979); this paper adopts the perspective that some resolution of these issues is possible, or at least should be sought. One approach is to adopt the theoretical framework (built on Giddens’ Structuration Theory (Giddens 1990)), as presented by Orlikowski and Robey (1991), and use it to analyse a new technology case, that of of computer-aided design/draughting. Introduction Markus and Robey (1988) identified three major defects in research focusing on the interaction of organisations and new technology: ♦ inattention to the question of causal agency; ♦ over-reliance on variance models in theory; ♦ failure to distinguish among individuals, groups and organisations as levels of analysis. They recommended emergent models of causal agency (with the social meaning associated with technology as a central theme), using the logic of process theory (which is concerned with explaining how outcomes develop over time) and linking multiple levels of analysis (ie. both micro and macro levels). However this, too, was criticised for failing to develop a specific theory or framework, which could be used to guide further research (Orlikowski and Robey 1991). As a possible solution, Orlikowski and Robey presented a theoretical framework built on Giddens’ Structuration Theory (Giddens 1990). The social science theoretical controversy focuses on which perspective is most appropriate for exploring and understanding social phenomena, in this case the study of technology in organisations. Which set of assumptions is more appropriate: either objective/positivist (the institutional aspects of social systems which are perceived as being independent of and constraining human action) or subjective/interpretivist (social systems as the result of meaningful human behaviour)? Each of these assumptions can act as an underlying Laurence Brooks University of York page 2 epistemology which guides the researcher and, hence, research. However these two philosophical positions represent the extreme ends of the same continuum, along which can be situated a variety of ontological assumptions and real-world approaches. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) presented the key features of these two paradigms to highlight the main differences in the viewpoints (see table 1 below). Table 1 Key Features of Positivist and Phenomenological Paradigms (source: Easterby-Smith et al. 1991) Positivist paradigm Phenomenological paradigm Basic beliefs: the world is external and objective observer is independent science is value free the world is socially constructed and subjective observer is part of what observed science is driven by human interests Researcher should: focus on facts look for causality and fundamental laws reduce phenomena to simplest elements formulate hypotheses and then test them focus on meaning try to understand what is happening look at the totality of each situation develop ideas through induction from data Preferred methods include: operationalising concepts so that they can be measured taking large samples using multiple methods to establish different views of phenomena small samples investigated in depth or over time Positivist studies (“functionalist” in Burrell and Morgan’s terminology) propose the existence of a priori fixed relationships within phenomena which generally are measured by structured instrumentation (such as a questionnaire survey), with the emphasis on “objective” consistent repeatable measurements. Interpretivist studies, in contrast, assume that through interacting with the world, people create and associate their own subjective and intersubjective meanings. Thus phenomena may be understood through accessing these meanings, which have been uniquely assigned by participants. There is much to be gained from a “psychological” analysis of society, but it could be argued that some factors are still missing (for instance much of the psychological work tends to ignore cultural variation and thus tends to produce culture-bound, ethnocentric explanations of human behaviour). Psychology often seems to be naive and inattentive to issues of power, coercion and the rest of the “macroscopic” constraints over human behaviour. Equally it is possible to reify social phenomena out of all context and to ignore the very real feelings, meanings and intentions that social actors use to judge their surroundings. As Thomas and Thomas (1928) said: “If men define situations as real, then they are real in their consequences.” Laurence Brooks University of York page 3 The philosophical difference, in the underlying perspective guiding a study, has been argued as being one of the main reasons for the lack of unifying, substantive paradigms in sociological, organisational and information systems disciplines (Hirschheim and Klein 1989). However Orlikowski and Robey (1991) point to Giddens’ structuration theory as a possible solution: “He (Giddens) has developed a theoretical perspective...to accommodate the two traditions and hence offers a resolution to the heated debate...in Giddens’ view of social reality, both are equally important, and hence both should inform social theorizing and empirical investigations.” Giddens’ theory is used to build a theoretical framework which explores how new technology is created, used and becomes institutionalised within an organisation. Further this shows how the technology is both a product of, and a medium for, human action. Theoretical Framework Clark (1990) summarises the core of structuration theory (from Giddens) in a series of four interrelated points: 1. Social practices lie at the root of the constitution of both individuals and society this shifts the focus of social theory away from a) the individual actions and experiences of an individual actor, and b) the existence and requirements of some kind of societal totality. 2. Human agents are knowledgeable and have the capacity to exercise their powers to accomplish a social practice people often know what they can do (whether directly or in a “tacit” sense) in their daily interactions, and under given circumstances are able to do it. 3. These social practices are routinised and recursive, ie. ordered and stable across space and time people draw on “structural properties” (ie. rules and procedures), which are institutionalised properties of society, to construct the visible patterns (social practices) that make up society. 4. Structure is both the medium and outcome of a process of “structuration”, ie. it is activity-dependent, as seen in the production and reproduction of practices across time and space. However Giddens does not explicitly address the issue of technology in his “structuration paradigm”. Orlikowski (1992) has attempted to use the structuration viewpoint to examine technology within organisational settings. Therefore technology may be seen as one kind of structural property of organisations developing and/or using technology. Technology embodies and, hence, is an instantiation of some of the rules and resources constituting an organisation. Orlikowski (1992) discusses the “duality of technology”, ie. technology is created and changed by human action but is also used by humans to accomplish some action. 1 However Lukes (1979/1987) argues that in most cases people do not recognise when their real interests are at stake, ie. they are excluded from the social and political context of decision making. Therefore people can only act in a knowledgeable way given the limits of their personal knowledge. Laurence Brooks University of York page 4 A corollary of the duality premise is that technology may be “interpretively flexible”, such that the interaction of technology and organisation is a function of the different actors and sociohistorical contexts implicated in its development and use. Technology is the product of human action, ie. physically constructed by actors working in a given social context (arrow a, figure 1). Thus technology is created and maintained by human actors and has to be used by human actors to have any effect. Technology also assumes structural properties, ie. it is socially constructed by actors through the different meanings they attach to it and the various features they emphasise and use. In addition technology is built and used in a social context which exerts an influence on it (arrow c, figure 1). Human agents act, in an organisation, through use of the organisational store of knowledge, resources and norms (ie. the organisational structures of signification, domination and legitimation). Once deployed, technology tends to become “reified” and institutionalised. It loses connection with the human agents who construct it and give it meaning and therefore appears to be part of the objective, structural properties of the organisation. However agency and structure are not independent. The ongoing action of human agents in drawing on a technology objectifies and institutionalises it. Therefore if people changed the technology (either physically or interpretively) every time they used it, it would not assume the stability or “taken for granted” status necessary for institutionalisation. There are consequences of interacting with the technology, in particular the ability to influence the social context in which it is used (arrow d, figure 1). In using a technology the human agent either sustains or changes the institutional structures of the organisation in which they are situated, ie. reinforcing or undermining the structures of signification, domination and legitimation. Technology is also the medium of human action, ie. when deployed and used in organisations by humans, it mediates (enables and facilitates or constrains) activities (arrow b, figure 1). One crucial aspect of human action is that it can be knowledgeable and reflexive. Therefore agency refers to capability rather than intentionality, although human actions may have intended and unintended consequences. While the personal action of human agents using technology has a direct effect (intended and unintended) on local conditions, it also has an indirect effect (often unintended) on the institutional environment in which the agents are situated. The results cannot be guaranteed, even where the actions are directly intended to preserve or change some aspect of the institutional environment. Human Actors Technology Institutional Properties