Executive control without conscious awareness: the cold control theory of hypnosis

Control and awareness seem intimately related (e.g. Norman and Shallice 1986; Jacoby 1991). Of course, some forms of control occur quite unconsciously (plausibly, for example , the detailed configuring of motor movements; Milner and Goodale 1995). However, there are some forms of control, such as planning or overcoming strong response tendencies (the 'executive tasks' of Norman and Shallice) that are so commonly associated with conscious awareness that it would seem bizarre if they occurred without it. In fact, unconscious executive control is not possible in the theories of Norman and Shallice and Jacoby. In this chapter, we argue for the theoretical possibility of unconscious executive control, based on the higher order thought (HOT) theory of Rosenthal (1986, 2002, 2005), and then argue that hypnosis provides an example of executive control without conscious awareness (cf. A fundamental explanatory problem in hypnosis is how activities that are normally performed voluntarily out of the hypnotic setting can be performed with the experience of involuntariness after hypnotic suggestion (see Lynn and Rhue 1991; Fromm and Nash, 1992 for reviews). Of course, hypnotic phenomena present the researcher with many interesting problems to be explored, but a central if not defining issue is the experience of involuntariness, singled out as the 'classical suggestion effect' by Weizenhoffer (1974). It is this experience of involuntariness under hypnotic suggestion which makes the experience of carrying out otherwise mundane actions, such as slowly raising one's arm, holding one's arm out straight and rigidly, acting like a child, and so on, hypnotic rather than mundane. Other counterintuitive hypnotic phenomena, such as alterations in perception (positive and negative hallucinations), may also be examples of this process of creating the experience of involuntariness (cf. Bentall 1990; Frith 1992). Hypnotic behaviour involves planning, and yet can be performed without conscious awareness of the contents of the plans, and without conscious awareness of intentions to perform the In this chapter, we first review different types of control, and then we consider the distinction between control and awareness of control in the light of Rosenthal's (2002)