About the Description and the Origin of Biological Differences

mological challenges provided by new technologies, study of development, evolution, and regeneration in a variety of animal and plant species. The declared goal such as molecular imaging, computer simulations of regulatory networks, and artificial life. of its founder Hans Przibram was to arrive at " generalizations " that would unite several detailed empirical studies I have mentioned before that Keller is not a typical historian of biology and by her own admission she does (Przibram, Experimentalzoologie vol. 1–7, Wien: Deu-ticke, 1907–1929). Przibram also contributed to mathe-not write comprehensive historical treatments. Yet, in the case of Making Sense of Life, the particular arrange-matical biology (Przibram, Aufbau mathematischer Bio-logie, Berlin: Borntraeger, 1923) and, as the mentor of ment of chapters and themes and the implicit linear time frame does suggest a certain developmental perspec-both Paul Weiss and Ludwig von Bertalanffy, his influence continued well into the second half of the 20 th tive on its own. Therefore, the selection of topics is more of an issue in this work than it has been in Keller's century. Examples such as the Prater Vivarium make Keller's experience of the total separation between the other writings. Keller carefully selected her examples as illustrations for her main themes; the role and meaning cultures of experimental and mathematical biologists less of an inevitable epistemological divide. Such exam-of models, metaphors, and machines in explanations of development and the changing standards for explana-ples might also lead to a different answer with regard to Keller's question whether " Life " is a natural or a hu-tion and " understanding " in the recent history of developmental biology. Following a standard practice of de-man kind. The continuity of the experimental tradition in developmental biology, especially when compared to velopmental biologists, Keller chose several " outliers, " hoping that the unusual cases reveal more about the the more contingent history of mathematical models, certainly represents a challenge to philosophical inter-epistemological conditions than the mainstream or " normal " cases. While I am sympathetic to this approach—I pretations that concentrate largely on linguistic systems (see Rheinberger, Towards a History of Epistemic do think that we can learn as much if not more about science from its failures than from its successes—I also It does not, how-believe that such an approach only makes sense when it is embedded within a reasonably detailed account of ever, diminish the importance of detailed historical analysis of these …