Peter Carruthers In Defence of First - Order Representationalism
نویسنده
چکیده
Carruthers (2000; 2005) provides a general defence of reductive representationalism about phenomenal consciousness while critiquing first-order theories of the sort proposed by Baars (1988), Tye (1995), Dennett (2001), and others (thereby motivating a form of higher-order account). The present paper defends first-order theories against that attack.
منابع مشابه
A Defense of First-Order Representationalist Theories of Mental- State Consciousness
Recently, Peter Carruthers has advanced the debate over first-order representationalist theories (FORs) and higher-order representationalist theories (HORs) of consciousness by offering two innovative arguments in support of dispositionalist HORs. In this article, I offer a limited defense of actualist FORs by showing that Carruthers' two arguments either beg the question against such accounts,...
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