Money and Competing Assets under Private Information
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies random-matching economies where at money coexists with a real asset, and no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements. The real asset is partially illiquid due to informational asymmetries about its fundamental value. The extent to which the real asset is used as means of payment depends on the variance of its dividend as well as monetary policy. The e¤ects of ination on payment arrangements, asset prices, and welfare are analyzed. Keywords: Fiat money, payments, private information, liquidity, asset prices J.E.L. Classi cation: D82, D83, E40, E50 I thank for their comments and suggestions Murali Agastya, Aditya Goenka, Yiting Li, Ed Nosal, Peter Rupert, Neil Wallace, Pierre-Olivier Weill, Asher Wolinsky, Tao Zhu and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, National Taiwan University, National University of Singapore, Singapore Management University, the Southern Workshop in Macroeconomics (Auckland), and the University of California at Irvine. I also thank Patrick Higgins for his research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System. E-Mails: [email protected] and [email protected].
منابع مشابه
Working Paper 08 - 02 April 2008 Money and Competing Assets under Private
Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded offi cial Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Ban...
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تاریخ انتشار 2008