Hume and Abstract General Ideas

But t h a t t h i s i n f e r e n c e i s e r roneous , I s h a l l endeavor t o make appear, f i r s t , by p r o v i n g , t h a t ' t i s u t t e r l y i m p o s s i b l e t o conce ive any q u a n t i t y or q u a l i t y , w i t h o u t forming a p r e c i s e n o t i o n of i t s degrees : And second1 by showing, t h a t t ho ' t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e mind ?e n o t i n f i n i t e , y e t we can a t once form a n o t i o n of a l l p o s s i b l e degrees of q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y , i n such a manner a t l e a s t , as , however imperf e c t , may se rve a l l t h e purposes of r e f l e x i o n and conversa t ion . !TI 1 ,1 ,7 , p. 1 8 ) However, with r e spec t t o t h i s dilemma, H u m e says: The second i t e m Hume claims he i s about t o prove i s aimed a t t h e f i r s t d i s j u n c t of t he above-stated dilemma: more s p e c i f i c a l l y , it is aimed a t t h e claim t h a t (1) An a b s t r a c t i d e a (e.g., of a man) represents a l l poss ib le degrees of quan t i ty and q u a l i t y ( i n men) only i f the human mind i s i n f i n i t e i n capac i ty . To show t h a t (1) is f a l s e , Hum o f f e r s h i s own p o s i t i v e account of how ideas which a re pa r t i cu la r , i n na tu re may never the less be genera l i n representa t ion , even though t h e mind's capac i ty is f i n i t e . The f i r s t i t e m Hume sets o u t t o prove is aimed a t the second d i s j u n c t , and conclusion, of t h e dilemma: it is aimed, t h a t is, a t