The ALI test for insanity: a re-examination.

Since 1972, Roy Schafer has published a series of articles re-conceptualizing the language of psychoanalysis. 1 Through his "action language," Schafer has replaced the mechanistic propositions of traditional psychoanalytic metapsychology with propositions free of anthropomorphism and determinism. His work is aimed toward psychoanalysts; he believes his system offers analysts a clearer, simpler and more serviceable language than metapsychology. In an earlier article, 2 I tried to show that action language is useful also to forensic psychiatrists when they wish to make statements about criminal responsibility. It encourages simpler and clearer statements of psychological activity thereby making the psychiatrist's statement more comprehensible to the court. More importantly, it allows a common framework for law and psychiatry, revealing that it is spurious to believe the law's free will theory is incompatible with psychiatry's determinism (Cf. Stone, chap. 133). Finally, this simpler language allows the forensic expert to testify more clearly about the actions of the defendant without appropriating the court's responsibility for its determination. In this paper, I will try to extend the application of action language to criminal responsibility; my main purpose is to examine the American Law Institute (ALI)4 test from an action language perspective. But before I can do that comprehensibly, I must explain Schafer's fundamental rule and its implication for forensic psychiatry. 5