Policy Implementation and Cognition: Reframing and Refocusing Implementation Research

information (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Furthermore, strong motivation can affect the way reasoning is carried out, leading people to pay more attention to information consistent with the desired outcome or to discount inconsistent information (Klayman & Ha, 1987). For example, if we are presented with a problematic idea, such as the need for substantial changes in the way we teach science, the bias toward asserting that “things are working fine as they are” may lead us to focus on information from experience consistent with that point of view. On the other hand, motivation toward an outcome can also affect the investment we make in reasoning, so that we commit more effort to understanding and evaluating undesirable evidence than to desirable evidence, which is more easily accepted (Edwards & Smith, 1996). Motivation can also affect the use of personal memories in reasoning (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990), biasing memory search to recall examples consistent with the target assertion. For example, if one is pressured to assert that one is behaving in ways consistent with a reform initiative, one may more easily recall examples consistent with the reforms. This is particularly critical given the tendency discussed earlier to make superficial connections rather than deeper connections. Hence one may jump to conclusions and focus unduly on familiar aspects in understanding new policies or reform initiatives, and be ready to claim, “We already do that in our