Values of nondifferentiable vector measure games
نویسنده
چکیده
We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This new approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value [5] and the Neyman value [6] on a large space of nondifferentiable games. This in turn enables us to give an affirmative answer to the question, first posed by Neyman [6], whether the Mertens value and the Neyman value coincide “modulo Banach limits”? The solution is an intermediate result towards a characterization of values of norm 1 of vector measure games with bounded variation.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 42 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013