The core-partition of hedonic games
نویسنده
چکیده
A pure hedonic game describes the situation where player’s utility depends only on the identity of the members of the group he belongs to. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of core-partition in hedonic games. The condition is based on a new concept of balancedness, called pivotal balancedness. Pivotal balancedness involves especially the notion pivotal distribution that associates to each coalition a sub-group of players in the coalition. Then, we proceed to a review of several sufficient conditions for core-partition existence showing how the results can be unified through suitably chosen pivotal distributions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71.
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تاریخ انتشار 2006