An Anonymous Electronic Voting Protocol for Voting Over The Internet

In this work we propose a secure electronic voting protocol that is suitable for large scale voting over the Internet. The protocol allows a voter to cast his or her ballot anonymously, by exchanging untraceable yet authentic messages. The protocol ensures that (i) only eligible voters are able to cast votes, (ii) a voter is able to cast only one vote, (iii) a voter is able to verify that his or her vote is counted in the final tally, (iv) nobody, other than the voter, is able to link a cast vote with a voter, and (v) if a voter decides not to cast a vote, nobody is able to cast a fraudulent vote in place of the voter. The protocol does not require the cooperation of all registered voters. Neither does it require the use of complex cryptographic techniques like threshold cryptosystems or anonymous channels for casting votes. This is in contrast to other voting protocols that have been proposed in the literature. The protocol uses three agents, other than the voters, for successful operation. However, we do not require any of these agents to be trusted. That is, the agents may be physically co-located or may collude with one another to try to commit a fraud. If a fraud is committed, it can be easily detected and proven, so that the vote can be declared null and void. Although we propose the protocol with electronic voting in mind, the protocol can be used in other applications that involve exchanging an untraceable yet authentic message. Examples of such applications are answering confidential questionnaire anonymously or anonymous financial transactions.