Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
نویسنده
چکیده
No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal randommatching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of the randomization over deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 165 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016