Group Size and Cooperation among Strangers ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
We study how group size a ects cooperation in an in nitely repeated n-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n ≤ M are randomly and anonymously matched from a xed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We provide conditions for which the contagious strategy (Kandori, 1992) sustains a social norm of cooperation among allM players. Our main nding is that if agents are su ciently patient, a social norm of society-wide cooperation becomes easier to sustain under the contagious strategy as n→M . JEL Classi cation Nos: C72, C73, C78, Z13.
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