Namely-Riders: An Update

I here recall Ryle's analysis of Heterologicality, but broaden the discussion to comparable analyses not only of Heterologicality but also other puzzles about self-reference. Such matters have a crucial bearing on the debate between representational and non-representational theories of mind, as will be explained. 1 [1] The most remarkable thing about the so-called Heterologicality Paradox is that a straightforward logical analysis of the case shows there is no proper paradox. The appropriate analysis, moreover, has been published more than once, yet even its author did not see that there was no problem. [2] If the reader will take the trouble to consult, for instance, the 4th edition of Irving Copi's Symbolic Logic (Copi 1973), then, in the chapter about the theory of types, he will find the definition of heterologicality, and then a supposed proof of the contradiction: Het'het' iff-Het'het'. But Copi has to explicitly assume ''het' is univocal' at one place in this 'proof', so his otherwise thorough analysis shows instead that the contradiction is not derivable as a matter of logic, but rests instead on a contingent premise-which therefore Reductio requires we deny. [3] I will have some things to say later about Copi's blindness to his assumption. Indeed there are comparable blindnesses with many other 'self-referential paradoxes' which have impeded understanding of these matters, as we shall see. But in a volume celebrating the achievements of Ryle, it is appropriate first to realise that Ryle (Ryle 1951), saw the relevant point: ...what we are asked to decide is whether 'heterological' and 'homological' are themselves heterological or homological...But to ask this is to suppose that 'heterological' and 'homological' do stand for philological properties...And this supposition is false. Ryle then went on to make his well-known point about the unavailability of namely-riders in this case: If unpacked the assertion that 'heterological' is heterological would run:-'Heterological' lacks the property for which it stands, namely that of lacking the property for which it stands, namely that of lacking the