Gender and Piece Rates, Commissions, and Bonuses
نویسندگان
چکیده
Previous work shows that establishments with higher proportions of women are more likely to use piece rates hut that individual women are less likely to receive performance pay. We present a model in which lower expected tenure and labor force attachment are positively associated with piece rates but are negatively associated with other forms of performance pay. Analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) confirms that women are more likely to be paid piece rates and simultaneously less likely to be paid commissions and bonuses.
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تاریخ انتشار 2005