On finding the balanced path of hypnosis definition.

The 2003 APA Division 30 Definition of Hypnosis (Div30Def; Green, Barabasz, Barrett, & Montgomery, 2005) was the outcome of an attempt “to forge a definition that was first and foremost empirically-based, theoretically neutral, and relatively concise and ‘user friendly’ to promote widespread acceptance among clinicians, researchers, and the lay public alike” (p. 261). In setting out the procedure followed to develop this definition, Green et al. (2005) usefully note criticisms of The 1993 APA Division 30 Definition of Hypnosis (Kirsch, 1994), the influence of the working definition of hypnosis that was developed at the University of Tennessee’s Conference on Brain Imaging and Hypnosis (Killeen & Nash, 2003), and the contentious issues that emerged in crafting the definition that they present. In a sometimes strong comment on parts of this definition, Nash (2005) argues that “vicious intellectualism” can be seen in the definition, and that the definition “is a clunky half-measure that leaves the definitional door wide open to unfortunate research designs that are grounded in a priori theoretical biases” (pp. 266-267). In this comment, I wish to make three simple points: The first about what we should and should not expect from a definition of hypnosis; the second about the different audiences that we may want such a definition to speak to; and the third about finding the future path for a balanced definition of hypnosis that accepts ambiguity and embraces constructive pluralism. First, we should not expect too much of definitions in psychological science. Ideally, a definition provides a precise statement of the nature and boundaries of some thing, and makes it clear to us what that thing is and what it is not. But many things in psychology do not admit to easy definition. Hypnosis—as a phenomenon and a process—is one of those things. The essential issue that crafters of definitions have to come to grips with is whether their definition is a fair representation of what is currently known about the essential nature of the thing.