A Folk Theorem with Private Strategies
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper I prove a Folk theorem with T -private communication equilibria with an imperfect monitoring structure that may be public, private, and conditionally dependent or independent. I show that an efficient outcome is approachable as players become patient if every disobedience from efficiency is detectable by some player and some not necessarily efficient action profile. I also show that efficiency is approachable if and only if every profitable deviation from efficiency is uniformly and credibly detectable. JEL Classification: D21, D23, D82.
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