Repeated Games and Qualitative Differential Games: Approachability and Comparison of Strategies

نویسندگان

  • Sami As Soulaimani
  • Marc Quincampoix
  • Sylvain Sorin
چکیده

We study the notion of approachability in a repeated game with vector payoffs from a new point of view using techniques recently developed for qualitative differential games. Namely, we relate the sufficient condition for approachability (B-set) to the notion of discriminating domain for a suitably chosen differential game. The other goal of the present article is to obtain a new precise link between the strategies in the differential game and in the repeated game preserving approachability properties.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • SIAM J. Control and Optimization

دوره 48  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2009