Tamás Szentes
نویسنده
چکیده
The concept of “national competitiveness” is mostly confused with that of development of countries, often reduced to their economic growth only, and with that of competitiveness of enterprises of the latter, too. Its measurement by some composite indexes, particularly by the single “Global Competitiveness Index” in the annual reports of the World Economic Forum is not only biased by the neo-liberal perception of “national competitiveness” but due to several over-simplifications also makes the list ranking the countries accordingly very doubtful. The involved ideology serves for justifying anti-social economic policies and inducing or compelling the governments to implement restrictive measures. The market-oriented approach embraces the assumption of a zero-sum-game, i.e. to win at the expense of other countries, which suggests a “bellum omnia contra omnes” instead of international cooperation.
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