Optimal Quotas in Private Committees
نویسنده
چکیده
According to conventional wisdom, raising the quota either causes a committee to retain the status quo or has no effect on its performance; so a committee which would otherwise reach good decisions should operate with a low quota. We show, per contra, that reducing the quota may improve the quality of new decisions which a private committee reaches. In particular, it is optimal to reduce the quota of a committee which would otherwise reach good decisions, despite the failure of conventional wisdom.
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