Optimal Agency Contracts for Delegated R&D
نویسندگان
چکیده
A principal delegates R&D to an agent when the researcher’s actions are unobservable. The optimal contract for delegated R&D is shown to take the form of an option. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the agent is subject to limited liability. The principal makes an implementation decision after observing the quality of the invention. The discussion considers experimental design with simultaneous sampling, sequential sampling and a combination of the two. The analysis also applies when the agent designs the experiment by choosing the distribution from which to sample, when the principal imperfectly observes the outcome of R&D,and when the number of samples is random.
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تاریخ انتشار 2013