A reply to Barrett (2016).

نویسندگان

  • Giulio Tononi
  • Christof Koch
چکیده

Barrett [1] makes three observations relevant to IIT 3.0 as discussed by Tononi & Koch [2]. Firstly, for many systems, F—as outlined in IIT 3.0—may not be computable as it may never be practical to carry out all possible discrete grainings in space, time and relevant functional elements and maximize over these. Of course, as Barrett himself points out, the fact that something may not be computable does not impact the ontological status of the theory (i.e. classical thermodynamics that deals with ensembles of the order of 10 23 particles). Secondly, even an idealized, abstract feed-forward system that, according to IIT 3.0, has zero F, may well have a non-zero F if built out of real physical components given reciprocal interactions at the molecular micro-level. This is a correct observation. The theory as presently formulated [3] deals with discrete (binary), simulated units implementing transition probability matrices. It remains to be seen whether the actual numerical value for F of a physical instantiation of a feed-forward system is numerically non-negligible. This would not, however, invalidate IIT 3.0. Even under these circumstances, it is likely that F associated with physically instantiated, strongly connected networks is much larger than F of physically instantiated, feed-forward networks (e.g. built with diodes or other one-way rectifiers). Thirdly, the world is continuous and not discrete. Many physical laws, such as quantum field theory or general relativity, are formulated using continuous fields. Therefore, IIT needs to be reformulated, as Barrett points out in his earlier writing [4]. Barrett may well be correct that IIT 3.0 needs to be reformulated to account for a continuous world with continuous variables. However, we would also like to point out that whether space –time is ultimately continuous or granular is heavily debated among fundamental physicists and no consensus appears to have been achieved. Competing interests. We declare we have no competing interests. Funding. We received no funding for this study.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences

دوره 371 1687  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2016