Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 an Explanation of Inefficient Redistribution: Transfers Insure Cohesive Groups
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چکیده
Redistributive policies often sustain inefficient economic sectors. Economists routinely argue that governments should let the sectors collapse, and compensate the affected agents. We explain why governments may instead prefer the inefficient redistribution. If income shocks in a given sector are more correlated than in the rest of the economy, and redistribution is related to individuals’ income, then by sustaining a sector, the government is also providing its agents with insurance. The agents would lose this insurance if they relocate to another sector. Government transfers to sectors with correlated incomes are therefore worth more than their monetary value. A preliminary analysis of the publicly-available data suggests that indeed agents in sectors that receive transfers are subject to more correlated income shocks. Our results imply that buying out inefficient sectors may not be the second-best policy when agents cannot fully insure themselves (markets are incomplete). JEL classification numbers: D72, D61, H2
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