When the unanimous voting rule is NOT the corollary to market exchange

Voting System: elections

A voting system allows voters to choose between options. And, an election is an important voting system to select a cendidate. In 1951, Arrow’s impossibility theorem in [1] showed that intuitively desirable criteria were mutually contradictory. Gibbard(1973) [2] and Satterthwaite(1975) [3] independently proved that for at least three alternatives, every Pareto optimal and non-manipulable choice...

Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules

Nanson’s and Baldwin’s voting rules select a winner by successively eliminating candidates with low Borda scores. We show that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. In particular, with unweighted votes, it is NP-hard to manipulate either rule with one manipulator, whilst with weighted votes, it is NP-hard to manipulate either rule with a small number of candidates and...

Revise and Resubmit, Economic Inquiry Theories of Commitment, Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games

Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity have all been invoked to explain and describe behavior in public goods and social dilemma situations. Commitment theories have been used to explain behaviors like water conservation and voting. Theories of altruism are applied to explain contributions to charities and intergenerational transfers and bequests. Theories of reciprocity have been inv...

Leader Role Inversion as a Corollary to Leader-Member Exchange

An Introduction to Voting Rule Verification

A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice

We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters, and core equivalence under certain cond...