Taxation, Fines, and Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency and Market Structure Implications
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper addresses the comparative efficiency of liability rules and regulatory policy in competitive equilibria with endogenous product safety. Pigouvian taxation fails to achieve long-run social optimality. A policy involving accident fines and safety subsidization can achieve efficiency, although the optimal policy may involve taxation, not subsidization, of product safety. Copyright 1998 by Stephen F. Hamilton. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. __________ This research has benefited from helpful comments by Jonathan Hamilton, Michael Hanemann, Theodore Keeler, Jeff Perloff, and, in particular, Dave Sunding.
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تاریخ انتشار 1998