Ex ante Randomization in Agency Models
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چکیده
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Principals seek to enter a productive relationship with agents by posting general incentive contracts. A contract is exclusive and must solve both the ex post moral hazard and the ex ante competitive search problem (participation). Menus of contracts do not help hence (single) contract posting is optimal. Principal competition restores some bargaining power with the agents, to whom principals m...
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