Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce the concept of disjoint payo¤matching which can be used to show that the mixed extension of a compact game is payo¤ secure. By putting minor structure on the discontinuities, we need only check payo¤s at each strategy rather than in neighborhoods of each strategy pro le, placing minimal restriction on the payo¤s at points of discontinuity. The results are used to verify existence of equilibrium in a general model of Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 152 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014