Sergiu Hart a Comparison of Non-transferable Utility
ثبت نشده
چکیده
Three values for non-transferable utility games – the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler–Owen consistent NTU-value – are compared in a simple example.
منابع مشابه
An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value
The Maschler–Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games is axiomatized, by means of a marginality axiom. JEL Classification: C7, D7
متن کاملClassical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts
The Value is a solution concept originally due to Shapley (1953). The idea behind the concept is to evaluate how much will a player be willing to pay to participate in a given game. It seeks to represent what the game is worth for a player. In some sense the value captures the expected outcome of the game. We will start with the TU (transferable utility) framework and the axiomatic approach and...
متن کاملFinite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field
This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for fini...
متن کاملBargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shap...
متن کاملCooperative Games in Strategic Form
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley...
متن کامل