A Dynamic Model of Bertrand Competition with Entry1
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چکیده
This paper analyzes a simple, repeated game of simultaneous entry and pricing. We report a surprising property of the symmetric equilibrium solution: If the number of potential competitors is increased above two, the market breaks down with higher probability, and the competitive outcome becomes less likely. More potential competition lowers welfare | another Bertrand paradox. The model can also be applied to auctions to explore whether a revenue maximizing auctioneer should restrict the number of bidders if bidder participation is costly.
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تاریخ انتشار 1997