Minmax and Maxmin of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
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چکیده
For a class of 2-Person 0-sum repeated games with incomplete information, Aumann/Masch. ler 119671 and Stearns [1967] have given a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of v (the value of the infinitely repeated game). Mertens/Zamir [19711 and Mertens [1971/72] have given the formula (and thus proved the existence) of lim Vn, the limit of the values of the n . .+ ~ games with n repetitions, for a much larger class of games than that treated by Aumann/Maschler and Stearns. In this paper we extend the Aumann-Maschler-Stearns results to the larger family of games studied by Mertens [ 1971 /721.
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تاریخ انتشار 1999