Robotic Specification of the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience

Standard, linguistic means of specifying the content of mental states do so by expressing the content in question. Such means fail when it comes to capturing non-conceptual aspects of visual experience, since no linguistic expression can adequately express such content. One alternative is to use depictions: images that either evoke (reproduce in the recipient) or refer to the content of the experience. Practical considerations concerning the generation and integration of such depictions argue in favour of a synthetic approach: the generation of depictions through the use of an embodied, perceiving and acting agent, either virtual or real. This paper takes the first steps in an investigation as to how one might use a robot to specify the non-conceptual content of the visual experience of an (hypothetical) organism that the robot models. Specifying the Content of Experience As with any science, a science of consciousness requires an ability to specify its explananda (facts, events, etc. to be explained) and its explanantia (states, facts, events, properties, laws, etc.) that do the explaining. Conscious states (experiences) may be expected to play both of those roles. A science of consciousness, then, has a double need for a way to specify experiences. At least part of what is essential to most, if not all, experiences is their content. The content of an experience is the way the experience presents the world as being. How can we specify the content of particular experiences? The standard way of specifying the content of mental states is by use of ‘that’ clauses. For example, ‘Bob believes that the dog is running’ ascribes to Bob a belief, the content of which is the same as, and is therefore specified by, the phrase following the word ‘that’: i.e., ‘the dog is running’. We call this means of specifying content linguistic expression because the content is specified not by finding a piece of language that refers to the content in question (as does the specification ‘The content of the experience that Christina had 2.5 minutes ago’), but rather by finding words that have or express that very content. Although linguistic expression works for specifying the content of linguistically and conceptually structured mental states (such as those involved in explicit reasoning, logical thought, etc.), there is reason to believe that some aspects of mentality (e.g., some aspects of visual experience) have content that is not conceptually structured (Evans 1982; Cussins 1990; Peacocke 1994; Chrisley 1994). Insofar as language carries only conceptual content, linguistic expression will not be able to specify the non-conceptual content of experience. An alternative means is needed. The need for an alternative has been recognized before, e.g. Chrisley (1994). Peacocke (1994) offers scenarios, ways of filling out the space around a subject, as a means of specifying a kind of non-conceptual content: scenario content. Bermudez (2003) carefully considers the problem of specifying what he calls ‘non-linguistic’ content, and offers some strategies for doing so. Other work, although perhaps not conceived of by its authors as potential solutions to this problem, can nevertheless be considered as such. In particular the work of Lehar (2003), which offers cartoons and sketches as a way of specifying striking aspects of human experience, is very sympathetic to the general approach we offer below. 2. Depictions: Do I Have to Draw You a