The Mental Life of Some Animals

The ascription of content based states-beliefs, desires, preferences, and so on-to nonhuman animals is still a subject of much debate in philosophy. Contemporary authors such as Donald Davidson, I R.G. Frey,2 Norman Malcolm,3 and Stephen Stich4 have all argued that the ascription of beliefs, desires, and other content based mental states to nonhuman animals is in some way misconceived. One important sub-class of these arguments, largely associated with Stich but also present in the work of the others, is based on the claim tlmt it is impossible to specify the content of such states as applied to nonhuman animals. The primary aim of this paper is to provide a sound theoretical underpinning to the practice of ascribing content, and, hence, content based states, to nonhuman animals. It will be argued that this practice is grounded in neither crude anthropomorphism, nor in sentimentalism, hut in solid, down to earth, evolutionary biology. Such a claim, of course, will, if correct, have significant consequences vis-a-vis the application of ethical theory to nonhuman animals. Most attempts to bring nonhumcUls into the moral sphere presuppose, at