Gender Equality and Democracy

Although democratic institutions existed long before gender equality, at this point in history, growing emphasis on gender equality is a central component of the process of democratization. Support for gender equality is not just a consequence of democratization. It is part of a broad cultural change that is transforming industrialized societies and bringing growing mass demands for increasingly democratic institutions. This article analyzes the role of changing mass attitudes in the spread of democratic institutions, using survey evidence from 65 societies containing 80 percent of the world’s population. The evidence supports the conclusion that the process of modernization drives cultural change that encourage both the rise of women in public life, and the development of democratic institutions. Direct correspondence to Ronald Inglehart, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106-1248; e-mail: [email protected]. Gendemoc.doc gendemoc.doc Page 1 of 33 1 Gender Equality and Democracy Introduction. Growing mass emphasis on gender equality is intimately linked with a broader process of cultural change that today is closely linked with democratization. In a sense the link between women’s representation and democracy should be self-evident, since women account for over half the population of most societies: if this majority doesn’t have full political rights, the society is not democratic. But for much of history, this proposition did not seem at all self-evident; until well into the 20 century, women did not even have the right to vote. Winning the vote meant overcoming traditional norms that varied from culture to culture but nearly always excluded women from politics. Thus, women attained suffrage by 1920 in most historically Protestant countries but not until after World War II in most Catholic ones, and still later in other cultural zones (IPU 1999). Even after being admitted to the electorate, women continued to be excluded from most political leadership roles until the last few decades, and they are still heavily underrepresented in parliaments and cabinets (UN 2000). Democratic institutions existed long before gender equality, but today, this article argues, growing emphasis on gender equality is an important factor in the process of democratization. Furthermore, as we will demonstrate, support for gender equality is not just a consequence of democratization. It is part of a broad cultural change that is transforming many aspects of industrialized societies and supporting the spread of democratic institutions. gendemoc.doc Page 2 of 33 2 Part I of this article briefly reviews the relationship between culture and women’s representation, and demonstrates the linkage between democratization and the proportion of women in parliaments in 65 societies worldwide. Part II examines the reasons for this relationship, including the role of changing values towards gender equality, the process of modernization and economic development, cultural legacies represented by religious values, and democratic political institutions. Part III demonstrates that growing support for gender equality in public life represents part of a broader shift towards expressive values, linked with the rise of postindustrial society. Part IV considers the implications of these findings, arguing that the process of modernization drives cultural change, which in turn leads to the rise of women in public life and the development of democratic institutions. I: Cultural Barriers to Women’s Representation Many factors help shape the structure of opportunities for women’s representation in elected office, including the institutional context and the resources that women and men bring to the pursuit of legislative careers (Rule 1987; Norris 1997; Karam 1998; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Caul 1999; Reynolds 1999). In addition to these factors, traditional cultural attitudes have long been thought to present major barriers to women’s representation in elected office, but previous studies have not present conclusive empirical evidence supporting this proposition. Theories of socialization have long emphasized the importance of the division of sex roles within a country -especially egalitarian attitudes towards women as political leaders (Sapiro 1983; Carroll 1994). Cultural explanations hypothesize that in traditional societies, women will be reluctant to run and, if they seek the office, will fail to attract sufficient support to win. Cultural attitudes may have a direct influence on whether women are prepared come forward as candidates for office (the supply-side of the equation), and the criteria used by gate-keepers when evaluating suitable candidates (the demand-side), as well as having gendemoc.doc Page 3 of 33 3 an indirect influence upon the overall institutional context, such as the adoption of gender quotas in party recruitment processes (Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris 1997). The cultural hypothesis provides a plausible explanation of why women in elected office have advanced much further in some democracies than others. For example, women attained leadership roles much earlier and much more extensively within the Nordic region than in such countries as France or Belgium, despite the fact that all of these countries are affluent European post-industrial welfare states, and established parliamentary democracies with similar proportional representation electoral systems (Karvonen and Selle 1995). Cultural differences also help explain why countries with a strict Islamic background-even the more affluent ones-consistently tend to fall toward the bottom of worldwide rankings of the percentage of women in parliament (Abu-Zayd 1998). Studies of post-industrial societies have found that the proportion of women in parliament is negatively associated with the historical prevalence of Catholicism, which seems to encourage more traditional attitudes towards women and the family than does a Protestant heritage (Rule 1987; Kenworthy and Malami 1999). But a broader comparison of 180 nation states by Reynolds (1999) found that on a worldwide scale, the greatest contrasts were between traditionally Christian countries (whether Protestant or Catholic) and all other religions including the Islamic, Buddhist, Confucian and Hindu faiths, all of which had lower proportions of women in legislative and Cabinet office. Consequently, cultural factors have been suspected to be an important determinant of women’s entry into elected office, but previous studies have been unable to test this proposition against comparable survey evidence of attitudes towards women across a wide range of nations. This article hypothesizes that the process of modernization leads to both democratization and a rise in the proportion of women in public life. It is well known that industrialization leads to occupational specialization, rising educational levels, and increasing levels of income. But economic gendemoc.doc Page 4 of 33 4 development also brings unforeseen cultural changes that transform gender roles and make the emergence of democratic institutions increasingly likely. Determined elites can resist these changes, and a society’s institutions and cultural traditions can facilitate or retard them, but in the long run, the underlying trend toward both gender equality and democratization becomes increasingly costly to resist. Evidence from more than 60 societies suggests that economic development propels societies in a roughly predictable direction, changing prevailing gender roles in virtually any society that industrializes. One indication that gender equality goes with democracy is the fact that democratic societies usually have more women in parliament than undemocratic societies. Figure 1 shows the relationship between a society’s level of civil rights and political liberties, and the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament. This figure includes 65 societies containing 80 percent of the world’s population. Countries that rank high on civil rights and political liberties, have much higher proportions of women in parliament than countries with low levels of freedom. A few authoritarian societies, such as China, have large numbers of women in parliament; while Japan, Ireland, France and the U.S. have high levels of democracy and relatively few women in parliament. But despite these exceptions, the overall relationship is strong, showing a .65 correlation. In democratic societies, women tend to be relatively well represented in parliament. (Figure 1 about here) II: Explaining the Relationship between Gender Equality and Democratization Why does gender equality in elected office tend to go with democracy? A key cultural change involves the belief that men make better political leaders than women. This view is still held by a majority of the world’s population, but it seems to be fading rapidly in advanced industrial societies. Evidence from the World Values Surveys demonstrates that in less-prosperous countries such as India, gendemoc.doc Page 5 of 33 5 China, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria or Egypt, from 50 to 90 percent of the public still believes that men make better political leaders than women (see Figure 2). But in advanced industrial societies, an overwhelming majority of the public rejects this idea. Furthermore, we find large generational differences in advanced industrial societies, where older citizens are relatively likely to believe that men make better political leaders than women, but younger citizens (especially younger women) overwhelmingly disagree. The long-standing belief that “men make better political leaders than women” is changing, as younger generations replace older ones. (Figure 2 about here) This belief is not just a matter of lip service. It has important political consequences. As Figure 2 demonstrates, in countries where the public rejects the idea that men make better political leaders, relatively high proportions of women get elected to parliament. This relationship is substantially stronger than the one shown in Figure 1 (the correlation rises from .65 to .77). This suggests that cultural norms may have even more impact than democratic institutions, on the percentage of women in parliament. Moreover, although richer countries have higher proportions of women in parliament than poorer ones, this may be true mainly because economic development leads to cultural changes. Table 1 tests these claims, examining the relative impact of cultural factors, economic modernization and democratic institutions on the percentage of women in parliament. (Table 1 about here) Modernization seems to be an important factor. Rich countries generally have higher percentages of women in parliament than low-income countries. And since economic development is closely linked with erosion of the belief in male superiority, and with democratization, it might be argued that the findings in Figures 1 and 2 simply reflect the effects of economic growth: it transforms gender norms and brings democratization and rising numbers of women in parliament. Model 1 (see gendemoc.doc Page 6 of 33 6 Table 1) confirms that richer countries (those with high per capita GDP) do, indeed, have higher percentages of women in parliament than poorer ones. But this factor explains only 30 percent of the variance, and when we add occupational structure and educational level to the equation (model 2), neither of them explains any additional variance. gendemoc.doc Page 7 of 33 7 Table 1. The impact of socioeconomic modernization factors, cultural factors and democratization on the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament (OLS regression) ________________________________________________________________________________________ (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) Modernization factors: Real GDP/capita, 1995 .862*** .445 __ -.403 -.386 __ ($1,000s) (.189) (.302) (.204) (.244) % in service sector, 1990 __ .157 __ __ __ __ (.154) % Educational enrollment __ .125 __ __ __ __ (.173) Cultural factors: Historically Protestant __ __ 16.91*** 11.51*** 11.49*** 9.45*** (1=Protestant, 0=not) (2.69) (3.39) (2.62) (2.45) Believe that men do NOT __ __ __ 18.48*** 18.73*** 14.56*** make better political leaders (3.19) (3.81) (2.57) Level of democracy: Freedom House scores, __ __ __ __ .0037 __ (sum from 1981 to 1999) (.030) Adjusted R2 .30 .29 .46 .70 .72 .70